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ABSTRACT 
 
Geographies of Identity Theft in the U.S.: 
Understanding Spatial and Demographic Patterns, 2002-2006. (December 2008) 
Gina W. Lane, B.S., Texas A&M University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Daniel Sui 
 
Criminal justice researchers and crime geographers have long recognized the 
importance of understanding where crimes happen as well as to whom and by whom.  
Although past research often focused on violent crimes, calls for research into non-lethal 
white-collar crimes emerged in the 1970s.  Today, identity theft is among the fastest 
growing white-collar crimes in the United States, although official recognition of it as a 
criminal act is a relatively recent development.  Remaining largely unmet, the need for 
white-collar crime research has greatly intensified considering the escalating identity 
theft problem.  Furthermore, many studies conclude that identity theft will continue to 
rise due to increasing technology-driven offenses via the Internet and widespread use of 
digital consumer databases.  Utilizing theoretical framework established in crime 
geography, GIS mapping and spatial statistics are employed to produce a spatial analysis 
of identity theft in the U.S. from 2002-2006.   
Distinct regional variations, such as high rates in the western and southwestern 
states, and low rates in New England and the central plains states, are identified for 
identity theft as reported by the FTC.  Significant spatial patterns of identity theft victims 
 iv 
alongside social demographic variables are also revealed in order to better understand 
the regional patterns that may indicate underlying social indicators contributing to 
identity theft. Potential social variables, such as race/ethnicity and urban-rural 
populations, are shown to have similar patterns that may be directly associated with U.S. 
identity theft victims. 
  To date, no in-depth geographic studies exist on the geographic patterns of 
identity theft, although numerous existing studies attempt basic spatial pattern 
recognition and propose the need for better spatial interpretation. This thesis is the first 
empirical study on the geographies of identity theft.  It fills in a void in the literature by 
revealing significant geographical patterns of identity theft in the digital age, attempts at 
understanding the social factors driving the patterns, and examines some of the social 
implications of identity theft. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
It is every type of crime but with a component placing it in the digital 
environment. It is able to operate instantaneously, remotely, and with 
disregard for sovereignty and geography. 
 (Len Hynds 2003, pg. 4) 
 
 
Identity theft disrupts the lives of thousands of people each year.  Unfortunately, no 
one, either alive or deceased, is immune from the threat (O’Brien 2004, DPS 2008).  
Overall, identity theft has become one of the fastest growing crimes in the United States, 
and has been the top consumer complaint in the U.S. since the year 2000 (Computer 
Fraud & Security 2008; Welborn 2004).  Furthermore, when considering the known 
links between identity theft, terrorism, and homeland security, the potential victims of 
identity theft may indirectly extend towards the entire U.S. population.    
Despite the seemingly ubiquitous prevalence of identity theft in the digital age, 
distinct regional patterns exist, which this study further examines (Mulrean 2006).  
Historically, many crime studies rely on crime mapping and a social ecology approach 
towards explaining the local physical and social conditions at high crime hotspots.  
Generally speaking, place-based crime theories seek to identify the local conditions that 
facilitate the confluence of victims and offenders in time and space (Anselin et al 2000).   
Interestingly, regional variations and hotspots for identity theft also persist, even though 
identity theft is unique in that victim-offender relationships can be, and often are, 
geographically decoupled.  This is possible because unlike traditional theft, identity  
________  
This thesis follows the style of The Professional Geographer. 
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thieves often surreptitiously employ hi-tech technologies such as computers and the 
Internet to inflict damage on unsuspecting individuals.  Although not all identity theft 
incidences occur via cyberspace, significant amounts do.  Therefore, alongside many 
other changes brought about by onset of the digital age, cyber crimes, such as identity 
theft conducted over the Internet, have the potential to break down traditional spatial 
barriers for crime, such as locational opportunity and victim-offender proximity.  This 
phenomenon is indicative of crimes conducted over the Internet, as traditional theft 
crimes are spatially dependent.  Overall, cyber crimes (although not limited to identity 
theft) have the ability to transcend physical spatial limitations potentially creating 
virtually limitless and anonymous links between victims and offenders.  Theoretically, 
cyberspace could eliminate the importance of place for crimes such as identity theft, yet 
the persistence of clear regional patterns indicates that place (e.g. local populations) 
remains important.   
Regardless of the growing prevalence of identity theft, official recognition of it as a 
criminal act is a relatively recent development, and academic researchers have been slow 
to respond to the growing threat.  In 1998, the federal government passed the Identity 
Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act (H.R.4151 and S.512, henceforth referred to as 
The Identity Theft Act), which officially defined and established identity theft as a 
criminal act punishable by law. The Identity Theft Act also established the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) as the lead agency to monitor, track, analyze complaints, and 
disseminate information to consumers, researchers, and law enforcement agencies 
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(United States 105th Congress 1998).  Since 2001, the FTC has logged increasing 
identity theft complaints, publishing the figures in annual clearinghouse reports  
(Table 1).  By the year 2006, over 1 million complaints had been cumulatively logged 
(Conkey 2006). 
 
Table 1: Federal Trade Commission Annual Identity Theft Complaints 
Year Total Complaints Annual Change Percent Change 
2002 161,896 -- -- 
2003 215,093 53,197 +32.85% 
2004 246,570 31,477 +14.63% 
2005 255,565 8,995 +3.65% 
2006 246,035 -9,530 -3.73% 
 
 
Although scholarly publications regarding identity theft are limited, much of the 
literature that exists comes from governmental studies, criminological research, or 
popular media (Cheney 2003; FTC 2003; Mulrean 2006; Newman & McNally 2005; 
Synovate 2003).  To date, no known spatial identity theft studies have been published in 
any geographic journals, although publications from other disciplines and in the popular 
media often exhibit geographic observations, attempt some degree of spatial 
interpretation, or propose the need for better spatial analysis.  For example, Mulrean 
(2006) states that identity theft is typically more urban than rural, has regionally high 
per-capita levels in the southwestern United States and low per-capita levels in the 
Central Plains, and may be affected by age.  Newman and McNally (2005) observe that 
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identity theft rates vary internationally, and call for additional research into the 
geographic and demographic trends that are outlined by the FTC and Synovate Reports 
(2003).  Allison et al (2005) call for additional research to determine whether the 
demographic findings in their study are localized or nationally representative.  This 
thesis, therefore, fits well into the literature as a response to these calls for taking a more 
explicitly geographic perspective on identity theft research.  This information is vital in 
formulating generalizations that may aid in determining effective strategies to address 
the growing identity theft problem at broader levels. 
This thesis fills a void in the literature by advancing our understanding of 
significant geographical patterns of identity theft in the digital age.  The specific goals of 
this research are: 
1) Identify unique spatial and temporal patterns of identity theft in the U.S.; 
2) Explore the social and demographic factors that may shape the regional patterns 
of identity theft in the U.S.; 
3) Discuss the social implications of identity theft and its relationship towards 
terrorism and homeland security. 
This thesis explores the geographic frontiers unique to identity theft, and will also 
establish identity theft spatial inquiry within geographic crime and identity theft 
literature. Furthermore, the findings of this study will provide a basis from which further 
analysis into the social factors of identity theft can be explored, and facilitate effective 
policies of fighting and preventing this prevalent white-collar crime in the digital age. 
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2. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1. Defining identity theft 
 
What exactly is identity theft?  Many have attempted to address this essential 
question, and as a result, there are numerous attempts at defining what is (and is not) 
identity theft.  Researchers generally agree that identity theft involves the fraudulent 
misuse of personal information for illegal activity and unauthorized personal gain, but 
some debate exists on where to ‘draw the line’ on what constitutes identity theft.  For 
example, Cheney (2003) argues that the simple use of a person’s bank or credit card 
account for unauthorized transactions should not be considered identity theft, but rather 
should be considered the simpler crime of payment fraud.  In another more 
unconventional interpretation of the problem, Caeton (2007) presents the bold argument 
that identity theft is not the victim-offender phenomenon popularized in the media. 
Rather, he posits that identity theft is actually a cultural myth, created by the politics of 
fear, in which the long-standing white-collar crime of fraud has been bureaucratically re-
codified as victim-offender ‘identity theft’ in order to shift the blame away from a lack 
of systematic safeguarding of personal data, which would solve the so-called identity 
theft problem.  Although extreme, Caeton does exemplify the wide range of defining 
views regarding the position of identity theft as a stand-alone crime.   
For the purpose of this research, however, the crime of identity theft is assumed to be 
real and prosecutable (Hynds, 2003), and the definitions established by federal law will 
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be used to ensure consistent and proper analysis of the FTC data.  According to the 
Identity Theft Act: 
[Identity theft occurs when someone] knowingly transfers or uses, 
without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person with 
the intent to commit, or to aid or abet, any unlawful activity that 
constitutes a violation of Federal law, or that constitutes a felony under 
any applicable State or local law (United States 105th Congress 1998, p. 
2-3).    
 
Table 2 lists the officially recognized FTC categories and sub-categories.  The FTC 
data makes no distinction within the categories or sub-categories regarding the severity 
of the incidences or type of personal information that was used.  Additionally, the sum of 
category complaint percentages may exceed 100% (thus also exceeding the number of 
actual victim complaints) due to some reports logging multiple categories of damages 
per incidence; however, each victim is only counted once per complaint, regardless of 
how many categories that were involved, thus providing an accurate overall victim 
complaint count.  It is within this framework of the Identity Theft Act definition and the 
subsequent development of the categorized FTC database, that I conduct this research 
(Table 2).   
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Table 2: FTC Categories and Sub-Categories of Identity Theft  
Major 
Category 
Percent 
of Total* 
(value) 
2002 
Percent 
of Total* 
(value) 
2006 
Sub-Categories 
Credit Card 
Identity Theft 
42% 
(68,100) 
25% 
(61,509) 
− New accounts, existing accounts, unspecified 
Phone or 
Utilities Fraud 
22% 
(35,617) 
16% 
(36,365) 
- New wireless, New telephone, Unauthorized 
charges to existing accounts, Unspecified 
Bank Fraud 
(checking, 
savings, EFT) 
17% 
(27,522) 
16% 
(36,365) 
- Existing accounts, Electronic Funds Transfer 
(EFT), New accounts, Unspecified 
Employment-
Related  
9% 
(14,571) 
14% 
(34,445) 
- No sub-categories 
Government 
Documents or 
Benefits Fraud 
8% 
(12,952) 
10% 
(24,604) 
- Fraudulent tax return, Driver’s license issued/ 
forged, Government benefits applied/ 
received, Other government documents 
issued, Social Security card issued/ forged, 
Unspecified 
Loan Fraud 6% 
(9,712) 
5% 
(12,301) 
- Business/ Personal/ Student loan, Auto loan, 
Real estate loan, Unspecified 
Other Identity 
Theft 16% 
(25,903) 
 24% 
 (59,048) 
- Illegal/ Criminal, Internet/ e-mail, Medical, 
Apartment/ house rented, Insurance, 
Property rental fraud, Bankruptcy, Child 
support, Magazines, Securities/ investments 
Source: Federal Trade Commission (http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/microsites/idtheft/) 
*Percentage sums exceed 100 due to individuals reporting multiple victimizations 
 
 
2.2. Crime geography and criminology literature 
 
Criminologists and geographers alike have long realized that understanding where 
crime happens is key to understanding why crime happens and to whom (Christens & 
Speer 2005; Roncek 1993).  Therefore, criminal justice researchers and geographers 
have understood the analytical and predictive roles of crime mapping (Anselin et. al 
2000; Harries 1974, 1999; Lottier 1938a, 1938b; Shannon 1954).  In general, geographic 
crime studies and crime mapping seek to accomplish three main goals: description, 
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analysis, and prediction (Harries 1974).  The main goal of descriptive mapping is to 
identify patterns, trends, and facts from the data.  Initial assessment of the data via GIS 
mapping and analytical methods, often called exploratory spatial data analysis (ESDA), 
is the first step in geographic crime study, and is the main goal of this research.  Second, 
analytical mapping accomplishes the goal of hypothesis testing in order to develop a 
base from which predictions are made.  It is the theoretical bridge between description 
and prediction mapping.  A secondary goal of this research is to establish enough 
geographic links between identity theft and demographic patterns to allow for future 
hypothesis formulation for further study in order to accomplish the ultimate goal of 
prediction, which is likely the most valuable product from a successful geographic crime 
study or model (Harries 1974). 
Historically, crime geography theory has passed through several major periods.  
The earliest studies, mainly conducted in the 19th century, were mostly environmentally 
deterministic (Anselin 2000; Cohen 1941; Harries 1974). Geographers attempted to 
explain observable seasonal and regional crime patterns through variations in the 
physical environment, such as climate, topography, or latitude.  Critics soon emerged, 
and after the turn of the 20th century, the era of environmental determinists waned.  In its 
place emerged the social theorists, largely originating from the Chicago School.   
Early social theorists incorporated the role of human conditions, such as urban 
environments, distance decay, and population characteristics, to explain local crime 
patterns (Cohen 1941).  In general, social human phenomena were used to provide an 
ecological explanation of crime patterns by linking existent local conditions to 
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observable spatial patterns (Harries 1974; Cohen 1941).  Later, detailed regional studies 
emerged which not only incorporated social conditions, but particularly emphasized 
regional spatial patterns of crime at multiple scales (Lottier 1938a, 1938b; Shannon 
1954).  Eventually, more radical geographic studies incorporated complex social science 
theories, such as the impact of social control systems, into geographic crime patterns 
(Lowman 1986).  However, some debate exists on the effectiveness of applying social 
theory in crime study.  Critics posit that it offers little new insight into violent crimes 
(Harries 1986) and does not explain differential responses (Herbert 1982).  For example, 
if social factors such as race, income, or family structure, are determined to cause 
criminal behavior, why are not all people with these characteristics criminals?  
According to Herbert (1982), this is a major shortcoming of using social theory in 
geographic crime studies. 
Regardless, a renewed interest in spatial crime study based on social theory is 
currently underway. Anselin et al (2000) largely attributes the renewal to recent 
analytical and technological improvements.  Better computing capabilities, powerful 
geographic information systems (GIS), and specialized spatial tools enable researchers to 
analyze large databases that were previously unmanageable, and reemphasize the 
importance of place-based crime studies.  As a result, Anselin et al (2000) states that 
geographic crime study is “… currently in the midst of a Chicago School 
revival…Though not causally related, recent developments of widely accessible 
computerized mapping and spatial analysis techniques have accompanied the resurgence 
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in popularity of ecological explanations of crime” (p. 218).  This thesis, therefore, will 
contribute towards this emerging body of renewed spatial crime analysis. 
Throughout the evolving theoretical eras, most geographic crime research has 
focused on violent crimes (Christens and Speer 2005; Harries 1988; Snook et al 2005), 
with an emphasis on determining either treatment or causation (Herbert 1982). 
Treatment research is usually an empirical criminology approach whereby mitigation 
strategies or actions are applied and analyzed for effectiveness through observed changes 
in the targeted criminal activity. Causation research, however, is much more ambiguous, 
and attempts to identify characteristics and causes of criminal activity from data 
collected from known offenders, victims, and criminal behavior patterns.  Herbert (1982) 
definitively states that researchers should keep offender and offense pattern analysis 
separate, and that analysis of offenses (e.g. victims) is particularly suited for geographic 
study (pp. 44, 101).  This is because offense patterns lend themselves largely to local 
conditions facilitating vulnerable environments, opportunities for crime, access routes, 
and criminal methods, thus allowing for spatial insight towards broader societal 
problems that facilitate the formation of vulnerable populations.  In other words, 
knowing where a certain crime is occurring is clue to discovering underlying social 
indicators facilitating the criminal behavior. 
Despite that violent crime studies have dominated past research, calls for better 
spatial research into non-lethal white-collar crimes emerged as early as the 1970s (Peet 
1975; Herbert 1982).  Remaining largely unmet since then, the need for white-collar 
crime research has greatly intensified considering the escalating identity theft problem 
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(FTC 2007).  The FTC data indicates that identity theft overall is steadily increasing; 
however, critics argue that increased public awareness is attributable to the rise in 
reporting frequency due to improved legislation, consumer education, and improved law 
enforcement reporting practices (Stana 2004).  Although this may partially explain the 
longitudinal increase in reports, Allison et al (2005) acknowledged this possibility and 
found substantial evidence that “… suggested an increasing trend for identity theft cases 
relative to other types of theft offenses” (p. 24).  Furthermore, many studies conclude 
that identity theft will likely continue to rise due to increasing technology-driven 
offenses via the Internet and illegal data mining of digital databases containing 
consumers’ personal information (Cheney 2003; Liu, et al 2005; Norum and Weagley 
2007; Slosarik 2002).  Clearly, the need for research into the geographic trends and 
underlying driving mechanisms of identity theft are overdue. 
 
2.3. Identity theft and white-collar crime literature  
 
2.3.1. Identity theft literature 
 
Identity theft is “[t]he quintessential crime of the information age…” (Kahn and 
Roberds 2008, p. 251).  Increasing use of electronic transactions, over the Internet and 
through the direct use of credit and debit cards, generates millions of opportunities every 
day and has vastly increased the risk for breach and misuse of personal information by 
identity thieves (Anderson 2006).  As a result, consumer reports of identity theft have 
increased dramatically, bringing much attention to the problem by the media, 
government agencies, and general public.  Until Slosarik (2002) published an overview, 
thus establishing identity theft as topic for academic research, scholarly publications 
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specific to identity theft were virtually non-existent.  Since then, a growing body of 
identity theft literature has emerged, which includes (but is not limited to) offender and 
victim trends and demography (Allison et al 2005; Anderson 2006), systemic enabling 
factors and solutions (Bourne & Deaton 2004; LoPucki 2002; Willox and Regan 2002), 
preventative and protection efforts (Milne 2003; Milne et al 2004; Norum and Weagley 
2007), financial system and consumer impacts (Cheney 2003), regional and behavioral 
patterns (Mulrean 2006), computer modelling (Kahn and Roberds 2008), and legislative 
efforts (Holt 2004; Moye 2006; Saunders & Zucker 1999).  This thesis will contribute 
the first known empirically geographic study of identity theft to the growing body of 
identity theft literature. 
Although many agree that the recent widespread growth of identity theft has been 
largely “E-enabled” (Pemble 2008, p. 7) by the advance of the digital age, identity theft 
itself is not new (Pemble 2008; Caslon Analytics 2008; Caeton 2007; Friedrichs 2007).  
History is riddled with accounts of identity imposters whereby individuals fraudulently 
assumed the literal identity of another for personal gain.  What has changed, however, 
are the available methods used to commit the offense.  Technological advances such as 
the Internet and computers have drastically increased the ease and efficiency by which 
offenders illegally obtain personal information (Slosarik 2002; Norum and Weagley 
2006; Pemble 2006).  Identity thieves digitally reach beyond political boundaries, 
bypassing security measures in place to thwart illegal movements of people, information, 
and goods.  These technological abilities contribute to the increase in identity theft, and 
are the enabling mechanisms for the decoupling of victims and offenders.  No longer is it 
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necessary for an individual to literally assume the living identity of, or be in contact 
with, another person in order to benefit from the assumption of personal information. 
A person’s identity involves social and personal associations such as nationality, 
ethnicity, gender, race, age, and socioeconomic status.  Identity is also a legal issue.  
Legal identity is delineated by official documents, paperwork, activity files, etc. and is 
essentially unalterable.  Legal identity takes precedence over social identity in the courts 
and is virtually inescapable, such as a criminal record or credit history.  It is the targeting 
of the legal identity, increasingly becoming digitally obtainable, which enables identity 
theft activity (Finch 2003).    
Identity theft involves the fraudulent use of base identifiers: birth name, race, 
birth date, etc.  Base identifiers remain unchanged over an individual’s lifetime.  
Secondary identifiers, such as drivers’ licenses, passports, visas, and green cards rely on 
base identifiers to connect to the individual. As the population has increased, base 
identifiers have become insufficient in uniquely identifying all individuals.  Therefore, 
numerical identifiers were introduced as a means to uniquely classify individuals in large 
populations.  In the U.S., the social security number (SSN) is the most important and 
ubiquitous numerical identifier.  Although the initial intent of the SSN was not as a 
universal identifier, the current amount of personal information associated with it makes 
it the “linchpin in advancing identity theft” (May and Headley 2004, p. 13).  Since all 
legal citizens in the U.S. have these numerical identifiers, yet identity theft does not 
appear to target victims randomly, a better understanding of the characteristics those 
experiencing higher rates is needed. 
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In general, offenders are known to utilize a wide array of techniques to illegally 
obtain personal information about their victims. Traditional, low-technology methods 
continue to persist and include mail fraud, ‘dumpster diving’ (retrieving discarded 
documents), stolen wallets/purses, and obtaining information through personal contacts 
(known as social engineering) (Javelin Strategy & Research 2006).  High-technology 
methods using computers and the Internet (e.g. scams, malicious spyware, and illegal 
‘data mining’ of digital databases, etc), have greatly expanded the ability for identity 
thieves to remotely access personal information (Allison et al 2005; Cheney 2003; 
Furnell 2007; Slosarik 2002), and are widely believed as the vehicles enabling the recent 
explosion of identity theft.  In sum, the Internet has increased the speed, ease, and 
efficiency of identity theft.  As the opportunity for high-technology offenses is expected 
to increase, the more tedious, low-technology methods are likely to become less 
appealing.   
Although identity theft is largely motivated by pecuniary want, the damages 
victims experience are both financial and non-monetary, such as false arrests, social 
denunciation, collection agency harassment, credit denials, and loan refusals (Kreuter 
2003; Newman & McNally 2005; Slosarik 2002), not to mention time lost correcting the 
damage, and personal distress (Furnell 2007).  Like many crimes, actual measurement of 
the extent of identity theft is difficult due to suspected low rates of reporting and the 
tendency for identity theft incidents to be multi-faceted, which may result in multiple 
reports per victim (FTC 2003; Hayward 2004; Newman & McNally 2005; Stana 2004).  
Besides financial motivation, there are other known motivating factors.  Some identity 
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thieves have been known to desire a ‘fresh start’ from an undesirable past.  Others are 
seeking alternative identities in order to clandestinely engage in illegal activity (Finch 
2003).   This last motivating factor is particularly important in understanding the role 
which identity theft plays in terrorism, a topic that will be discussed at length below 
(Sullivan 2004; Collins 2006; Willox & Regan 2002).  
Better understanding of identity theft is critical in order to thwart the continued 
growth of the crime.  Identity theft is expected to increase into the unforeseeable future 
largely because of a plethora of existing electronic databases that contain vital personal 
information.  Many of these databases do not have adequate security for protection 
against either internal or external data thieves.  International and inter-jurisdictional 
outsourcing of jobs also potentially increases the security threat (O’Brien 2004), and the 
tendency for identity theft to occur inter-jurisdictionally and in conjunction with other 
crimes often prevents the ability for lawmakers to specifically target it.  The resulting 
low prosecution and clearance rates, coupled with lenient sentencing, have created an 
environment conducive to rampant identity theft (Collins 2006).  In 2000, only one in 
700 identity theft crimes were prosecuted, meaning that the potential rewards are very 
high while the risk remains incredibly low (Sullivan 2004).  Since clearance rates are not 
rising at the same rate that reports of identity theft are, this figure is expected to worsen. 
It is obvious that identity theft is a very real and rapidly expanding problem in 
the digital age.  The broad range of disciplines producing studies and publications is 
indicative of its pervasive nature and broad extent, and clearly points toward the benefits 
of additional spatial and demographic inquiry. 
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2.3.2. Demographic observations in white-collar crime literature 
 
The identification of demographic associations are commonplace in many white-
collar crime studies in general, and identity theft studies in particular (Acohido 2007; 
Allison et al 2004; Anderson 2006; Ganzini et al 2001; Newman and McNally 2005; 
Synovate 2003; Weicher 2007; Willox and Regan 2002).  Demographic variables of both 
victims and offenders exist in the literature, although it is unknown whether victim and 
offender patterns are related.  Therefore, demographic subsets suggested in the literature 
for both victims and offenders are utilized in building the demographic database for this 
study, as known offender characteristics may indicate linked victim population subsets. 
Because the majority of identity theft incidences are considered white-collar 
crimes, a review of white-collar crime literature is important and offers helpful insight 
towards a better understanding of identity theft in particular.   The term ‘white-collar 
crime,’ first coined by Edwin Sutherland (1940), was initially defined by the social class 
of the criminals themselves.  Challenging dominant philosophy, Sutherland proposed 
that criminal activity is not caused by poverty or the social woes of the lower classes, but 
exists among members of all social strata, including the middle and upper classes.  
Sutherland proposed a distinction between “…crime in the upper or white-collar class, 
composed of respectable or at least respected business and professional men, and crime 
in the lower class, composed of persons of low socioeconomic status” (1940, p. 1), and 
introduced the concept of non-violent, largely financial offenses to scholarly social and 
criminological research. 
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Since Sutherland’s introductory research, a concise definition of white-collar 
crime has proven elusive, but modern definitions focus not only on the social class of the 
offender, but also on the nature of the crime itself.  Generally, white-collar crimes occur 
within a legitimate occupational environment, are economically motivated, and do not 
involve physical violence (Friedrich 2007).  The majority of identity theft offenses 
certainly meet these criteria.  Therefore, identity theft is considered a white-collar crime, 
although not all white-collar crimes involve identity theft. 
Unfortunately, research into white-collar offender demographics has been 
hindered by a lack of comprehensive data.  Low prosecution and conviction rates, 
coupled with low reporting rates of white-collar crimes by both victims and law 
enforcement, have resulted in a virtual dearth of comprehensive data (Croall 2001).  The 
available data is largely based on known offenders and consumer reports, may be 
affected by prosecution, judicial, and law enforcement biases, and is consequently not 
randomly generated.  For example, Green (1993) suggests that offender clearance rates 
for embezzlement may be affected by demographic factors of age, gender, and race.   
Regardless of data shortcomings, researchers have revealed some demographic 
trends for white-collar criminals. Known characteristics of white-collar criminals differ 
from conventional ‘street’ and violent criminals.  White-collar criminals are usually 
older, rarely have prior arrests, and are often highly educated.  White-collar criminals are 
often members of higher socioeconomic groups, thus introducing social stratification 
associations (Friedrichs 2007).  Although offenders are less likely to be drug addicts 
than street criminals, researchers recognize that drug addiction may increase the 
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likelihood of financially motivated crimes and identity theft (Croall 2001; NDIC 2007; 
Payne 2003).   
Although a significant number of offenders are male members of ‘elite’ social 
classes, they do not comprise the entirety.  Many are middle class females and are often 
employed in lower-level clerical positions.  For example, bank embezzlers tend to be 
younger, female, and living in stable home environments (Croall 2001).  Although the 
criminal male typecast persists, in reality more women commit fraud than men, and 
researchers have found that women are more likely than men to be motivated by 
personal reasons such as financial need (Croall 2001).  
White-collar criminals also have different age and racial profiles than 
conventional criminals (Croall 2001, Friedrich 2007).  White-collar criminals are usually 
older with racial profiles similar to the general population.  White offenders tend to be 
from higher socioeconomic groups, while black offenders are more often from lower 
socioeconomic groups.  Most attribute the socioeconomic differences largely to 
employment discrimination.  Regarding the age of offenders, one U.S. study revealed the 
average age of all white-collar offenders to be forty years; however, mail fraud and 
embezzlement offenders tended to be younger (Croall 2001).  It is possible then, that 
identity thieves may be slightly younger than other white-collar criminals.  
Despite the fact that many white-collar offenses go unreported, victim data is 
more comprehensive than offender data.  From existing data, researchers have 
discovered that different white-collar crimes are known to target specific groups.  For 
example, women have historically been victimized by financial fraud due to presumed 
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assumptions that women are not as knowledgeable about finance and investing as are 
men.  Additionally, older cohorts have been targeted by financial fraud, largely because 
older citizens often have higher incomes and greater wealth, thus making them attractive 
targets (Croall 2001, p. 74).  There is some concern that victim reporting may be biased 
towards higher educated individuals due to the fact that they are more likely to possess 
the knowledge and resources to report and prosecute the offense.  Regardless, white-
collar crime victims appear to be a population subset with identifiable demographic 
characteristics, which provides the basis for the creation of the demographic database for 
this thesis. 
 
2.3.3. Demographic observations in identity theft literature  
 
Identity theft is not an equal opportunity crime.  Although the FTC clearinghouse 
reports reveal some associations between identity theft complaints and demographic 
trends, this thesis seeks to further investigate demographic links to identity theft.  The 
literature suggests an abundance of demographic observations warranting further 
examination.    For example, general trends in identity theft are known such as urban 
propensity, exceptionally low clearance rates, and localized demographic characteristics 
such as gender, age, and race (Allison et al 2005).  Social indices such as level of 
urbanization, socio-economic status, and family structure have been identified as 
potentially related factors for criminal behavior in general (Glaeser and Sacerdote 1999).   
Studies have shown that some age groups are higher risk for identity theft (Table 3):1  
                                               
1
 These figures are approximate and may vary slightly depending on the data year.  Other researchers have 
revealed similar figures for different years, e.g. May and Headley 2004. 
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  Table 3: Frequency of Identity Theft within Age Cohorts 
Age Group Percent of Victims Percent of Total Pop Representation 
0-17 2 % 26.4 Under 
18-29 26 % 15.8 Over 
30-39 28 % 15.4% Over 
40-49 22 % 15.1% Over 
50-59 13% 11% Over 
60+ 9% 16.3% Under 
Sources: Stana 2004;  U.S. Census Bureau, decennial census data 2000 
 
 
College students have also been targets of identity theft because of widespread 
institutional use of social security numbers, plus students with clean credit records are 
often targeted by credit companies, and young students may be relatively naïve 
regarding financial decision-making (Weicher 2007).  Certain occupations have also 
been found to carry a higher risk for identity theft.  High-paying professions such as 
physicians and celebrities have been targeted, as well as professions that offer personal 
information more easily such as university professors and government employees (May 
and Headley 2004).  Case studies of particular incidents illustrate this well.  For 
example, Abraham Abdallah, 32, stole the identities of over 200 celebrities listed in the 
“Forbes 400,” eventually accessing potential billions of dollars before being caught in 
2001.  In 2002, Linus Baptiste, 43, co-conspired with Philip Cummings, 32, to steal the 
identities of 33,000 victims by obtaining user names and passwords through employment 
at a credit-checking communications company.  In 1998, Anthony Lamar Taylor, 30, 
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successfully posed as golf superstar Tiger Woods for a year before getting caught 
(Sullivan 2004).   
Some studies specifically examine the demographics associated with identity 
theft (Table 4).  Allison et al (2005) examined the demographic trends of both victim 
and offenders in a particular Florida metropolitan area with intriguing results: 
 
Table 4: The Demography of Identity Theft in a Florida Metropolitan Area 
 
Demographic 
Variable Victims Offenders  
White 72% 27% 
Black 20% 69% 
Hispanic 1% 1% 
Asian 6% 1% 
Female 46% 63% 
Male 54% 37% 
Mean Ages 40.56 32.23 
 
 
The Hispanic population was especially recognized as underrepresented because 
19-percent of the metro area population is Hispanic, yet there was a negligible Hispanic 
representation (only 1-percent of both victims and offenders) in the identity theft data.  
Whites were overrepresented as victims (72-percent), and blacks were overrepresented 
as offenders (69-percent) in this study.  Lastly, the study also revealed that 53-percent of 
the offenders were unemployed, 3-percent retired, and another 3-percent were disabled.  
This suggests economic gain as a motivator for identity theft. (Allison et al 2005). 
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Anderson (2006) suggests that demographic variables (e.g. income and education 
level) are viable proxies to test for populations vulnerable to identity theft, such as the 
hypothesis that people who conduct more non-cash transactions and utilize numerous 
accounts are more at risk for identity theft.  Anderson also suggests that single heads of 
households and households with children may also be more vulnerable.  This is based on 
the idea that couples have double the eyes and attention to discover identity theft, and 
children create additional transactions, each of which, although minute, poses a new 
opportunity for a breach of personal information.  Using probit regression, Anderson 
concluded that families with three or more children had a significantly higher risk for 
identity theft.  Other social groups suggested in the literature as potential high-risk 
groups for identity theft include people living in close group quarters such as students 
(Newman and McNally 2005; Norum and Weagley 2007; Weicher 2007) and military 
members, (Acohido 2007; Newman and McNally 2005), medical patients (Ingram 
2006), and even the deceased (CIFAS 2004; DPS 2008; O’Brien 2004).   
In sum, victims of identity theft are members of a population subset which may be 
partly determined by certain underlying geographic and/or demographic characteristics.   
By identifying which demographic characteristics may be disproportionately associated 
with identity theft, researchers may be able to predetermine those most at risk.  This may 
lead to potentially revealing more complex associations and insight beyond that of 
statistical and exploratory data analysis (EDA).  
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3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
3.1. Data 
 
This research is conducted with data from two primary sources: 
 
1) Identity theft data from the FTC 
2) Demographic data from the U.S. Census Bureau 
 
The Federal Trade Commission releases annual identity theft clearinghouse reports 
(available from: http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/microsites/idtheft/reference-
desk/index.html).  The majority of complaints are logged via direct consumer input to 
the FTC, however other organizations also contribute, including the U.S. Postal 
Inspection Service, Internet Crime Complaint Center (www.ic3.gov), plus others (FTC 
2004, 2005).  Preliminary examination of the data revealed visible regional variations, 
thus prompting the need for an in-depth spatial analysis to determine whether the visible 
patterns can be significantly explained through exploratory spatial data analysis (ESDA) 
and statistical analysis. 
Demographic data was mostly obtained from the U.S. Census bureau website.  The 
census data was acquired directly from the American Factfinder (factfinder.census.gov), 
and population estimates (www.census.gov/popest/estimates).  Whenever possible, the 
demographic data was obtained for the corresponding year of FTC data; however, when 
estimates are not available, Census 2000 data was used.  
The FTC identity theft data are aggregate, and the FTC clearinghouse releases 
identity theft figures at national, state, and MSA scaled levels.  Because this study 
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analyzes the state-level identity theft data, the demographic data was amassed at the 
corresponding state-level scale.  
 
3.1.1 Data issues and challenges 
 
 Because the data is aggregate, it is imperative to acknowledge potentially related 
problems. Certain challenges and concerns are endemic to aggregate data, and can be 
particularly troublesome for spatial analysis.  First, aggregate data is secondary, meaning 
that it has undergone some processing of the raw data beforehand (Rafanelli et al 1996).  
The algorithms used in the pre-processing of the data is often unknown (i.e. the data sets 
are released without metadata), and it is possible that the methods used to create spatial 
aggregations (such as statewide counts, sums, averages, categorizations, etc), may affect 
the final aggregate values.   
In regards to the spatial analysis of aggregate data, perhaps the greatest concerns 
stem from the Modifiable Areal Unit Problem (MAUP) (Openshaw & Taylor 1982).  
The MAUP exists because geographic space can be divided into potentially infinite 
arbitrary units.  Since geographical space is continuous, the analysis of data collected 
within that space can be greatly affected by the scales and/or zones of the data 
aggregation (Openshaw & Taylor 1982), which can potentially be manipulated by the 
analyst in order to produce favorable outcomes (Anselin 2006).  Data aggregated by 
political units, such as the statewide FTC data, is confined to a priori boundaries, which 
cannot be manipulated by the analyst, but it is unlikely that these boundaries will have 
any direct relationship to the spatial phenomenon being observed.   
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For example, a spatial study conducted by a private industry fraud detection 
service, ID Analytics (2007a), illustrates the effects of the MAUP well.  Using credit 
application data and fraud detection models, ID Analytics determined rates of 
application fraud, thus producing a geography of offenders rather than victims.  When 
analyzing the fraud rates at the statewide level, the results were very similar to the FTC 
victim patterns.  States with high rates of fraudulent applications included the western 
states of WA, OR, CA, NV, AZ and TX, plus NY, IL, and MI.  States with very low 
rates of fraudulent applications included the upper New England states of ME, NH, VT 
and the northern plains states of ID, MT, WY, SD, and IA.  However, when analyzing 
the same raw data at smaller scales, (the 3- and 5-digit zip code levels) the results were 
quite different.  As the scale becomes smaller, strong regional patterns became much less 
prevalent, to the point where at the smallest scale 5-digit zip code level, contradictory 
findings emerged.  At the 5-digit zip code level, high fraudulent application rates 
originated from states that were considered overwhelmingly low overall.  In fact, the zip 
code with the second highest fraud risk in the U.S. from 2003-2006 was in South 
Dakota, a state which is considered consistently low in identity theft risk.  A second ID 
Analytics (2007b) report identifies the top ten 5-digit zip codes with the highest identity 
fraud increases in 2006.  Six were in Montana, and three were in North Dakota, (also 
recognized in other studies as low-risk states), again showing that small-scale analysis of 
the same data can yield very different results than coarse scale.  It is unknown if similar 
spatial trends could be found with the FTC identity theft data, as the FTC does not 
release it at selectable scales such as the Census Bureau. 
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Understanding the MAUP leads into another problem inherent to aggregate data: 
the ecological fallacy.  The ecological fallacy problem states that “…conclusions 
obtained at aggregate levels do not translate to meaningful behavioral interpretations at 
the micro scale” (Anselin 2006, p. 4).  Researchers have long recognized problems in 
assuming characteristics of the individual from aggregated data of larger populations, 
and for this reason, the findings from this thesis cannot be used to infer information 
about small populations or individuals. 
Certain problems inherently exist with most crime databases as well (Harries 1974; 
Herbert 1982).  For example, recall that under-reporting and misreporting (by 
individuals, victims, or authorities) are concerns for the data being under-representative 
of the true extent of identity theft.  Also, differences in attitudes and classification 
methods across jurisdictions and/or agencies could affect the data, and could also impart 
spatial irregularities if these classification differences vary regionally.  There also exists 
concern that changes in reporting practices, public awareness, and legislation could 
affect data collection, particularly data that is amassed temporally as in the FTC 
Consumer Sentinel.  Despite these challenges, official aggregated data, such as the FTC 
clearinghouse, is the only known data source publicly available, leaving no viable 
alternatives. 
Regardless of the limitations of aggregate data, the FTC data is considered the most 
comprehensive identity theft data in existence (Newman & McNally 2005).  To date no 
known comprehensive database of identity theft incidences with demographic data 
exists; therefore, aggregate data must be utilized, largely due to a dearth of non-
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aggregated data and the difficulty or impossibility in obtaining such data.  Regardless, 
the significant correlations revealed by this study between demographic groups and 
known identity theft incidences may provide opportunities for additional research or case 
studies to explore more specific associations. 
 
3.1.2 Identity theft data 
 
As per the requirements of the Identity Theft Act (United States 105th Congress 
1998), the FTC established the Identity Theft Clearinghouse, and in 1999 began to amass 
consumer complaints into a large centralized database called Consumer Sentinel (FTC 
2003).   The majority of complaints are logged via direct consumer contacts with the 
FTC, however numerous other agencies also contribute (FTC 2003, 2004, 2005).  The 
FTC then categorizes the data by different types and subtypes, separating identity theft 
related fraud from other types of fraud, and annually releasing the figures to the public 
via clearinghouse reports, which are available from the www.ftc.gov identity theft 
reference desk.  
It is important to note that data included in the FTC identity theft categories and sub-
categories, such as credit card, phone utilities, and bank fraud are amassed separately 
from fraud incidences that do not involve the misuse of personal information.  For 
example, Consumer Sentinel logged in excess of 635,000 complaints in 2004, 39-percent 
of which were fraud by identity theft, with the remaining 61-percent being non-identity 
theft fraud complaints.  In sum, not all fraud complaints involve the misuse of personal 
information, and are not included in the identity theft database; however, the FTC uses 
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the term “fraud” interchangeably within the identity theft and non-identity theft data, 
thus potentially causing some confusion in the category definitions.   
Although the FTC data is the most complete central repository of identity theft data 
currently in existence, it is still believed to be under-representative of the true scope of 
identity theft incidences, and may have some reporting errors due to multiple-agency 
contributions (for example, if a consumer contacts multiple agencies, thus generating 
multiple counts per incident) (Newman &McNally 2005). Despite that the FTC data 
does not represent the actual scope of the identity theft problem2, researchers conclude 
that it is substantial for spatial analysis and the identification of geographic trends 
(Allison et al. 2003).  To date, truly representative data are lacking due to a combination 
of hurdles.  A lack of coordinated interagency cooperation exists, and white-collar 
crimes (identity theft in particular), are beset by low reporting and clearance rates, thus 
hindering capture of all incidences and posing difficulties in the creation of unbiased, 
comprehensive datasets (Allison et al 2005; Newman & McNally 2005; Slosarik 2002).   
The aggregated identity theft database for this project was created by harvesting the 
annual figures from the FTC clearinghouse reports.  Unfortunately, the report formats 
are not consistent, thus requiring some data extraction for 2002, 2005, and 2006.  For 
these years, individual state data were released as linked state maps, whereby the data 
was obtained by manually selecting each state individually from the online base map.  
                                               
2
 Realizing that the scope of identity theft is likely much higher than the complaints logged by the 
Consumer Sentinel, the FTC commissioned Synovate, (a global market research firm under Aegis Group) 
to conduct a nationwide poll to determine a more accurate extent of identity theft.  From this study, annual 
incidences of identity theft in the U.S. are estimated at over 9 million (Synovate 2003). 
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 From 2002 through 2004, the state data and identity theft categories were reported 
as actual victim counts. However, for 2005 and 2006, the data was released as state 
victim totals with category percentages.  Therefore, the derivations of actual victim 
counts by category for each state were calculated by multiplying the identity theft 
category percentages by the total victim counts.  For example, in 2005, Arizona logged 
9,320 victims, with 26-percent reporting credit card theft, or 2423.2 victims for the credit 
card category.  Since the existence of a fraction of a victim is not feasible, the derived 
counts are rounded up to the next integer, thus introducing the existence of a small 
rounding error for the 2005 and 2006 data.  Cumulatively, the rounding error is slight 
and is unlikely to affect the analysis results.  
The final database encompasses annual FTC identity theft data from 2002 through 
2006, reported as state-level figures broken down by FTC category (Table 2).  
 
3.1.3 Demographic data 
 
The demographic variables (or proxies) suggested in the identity theft literature 
acted as guidelines for the selection of potential demographic variables for this study 
(Appendix 2) from which an extensive database was built using data obtained from the 
U.S. Census Bureau and Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) (www.ppionline.org).  The 
majority of demographic data for this study was obtained through the U.S. Census 
Bureau (http://www.census.gov/).  Whenever possible, Census population estimates for 
the demographic variables are obtained to better correlate with the identity theft 
reporting years.  However, the Census Bureau does not produce estimates for all 
population subsets, in which case Census 2000 data was utilized.  The Digital Economy 
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Index scores (DigEcon) and online population (OnlinPop) were obtained from the 
Progressive Policy Institute (PPI), a governmental non-profit research and education 
organization that produces a State New Economy Index as a means of calculating U.S. 
states’ progression towards a digital economy (PPI online). The Digital Economy 
variables were obtained based on the literature which states that the Internet is a key 
element in the rise in identity theft.  
 
3.2  Methodology 
 
This study fits well and addresses research gaps within the literature of both crime 
geography and identity theft research.  Overall, by utilizing theoretical framework 
established for crime geography (Harries 1974, 1999), addressing the calls for better 
spatial analysis of identity theft (Newman and McNally 2005; Allison et al 2005), and 
expanding research knowledge of existing identity theft/demographic studies (Allison et. 
al 2005; Anderson 2006), this project seeks to contribute a social ecology spatial 
analysis to the nascent body of identity theft research.  The goal is to identify significant 
spatial patterns of identity theft victims alongside social demographic variables in order 
to determine correlated spatial patterns that may reveal underlying social indicators 
contributing to this pervasive crime.  By using spatial statistics techniques and GIS 
mapping, distinct regional variations are identified for identity theft as a whole, as well 
as for the FTC classification categories. Additionally, statistically significant correlations 
reveal potential social variables, such as race/ethnicity and urban-rural population 
composition, that may be directly associated with identity theft victims in the U.S. from 
2002 through 2006.  
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3.2.1 Selection of significant demographic variables 
 
 The purpose of this phase of the analysis is to determine correlations between the 
demographic data and the identity theft data.  To accomplish this, traditional statistical 
tests were performed using the master database (containing both demographic and 
identity theft data) to determine which variables return significant correlations (see 
Appendix 2 for complete list of results).  Using identity theft per capita rates (by 
category and by year) as the dependents (y), and demographic variables as the 
independents (x), SPSS software was employed to run both uni- and multi-variate 
regression analyses in order to narrow down the demographic variables to a more 
specific quantity.  The null hypothesis being tested was that the slope of the regression 
line is zero (Ho: β1 = 0), thus indicating no correlation if the p-value is greater than α = 
.05 for a 95-percent confidence level.  For the years 2002 and 2006, by holding the per 
capita identity theft dependent variable constant and repeatedly running regression 
analyses for each demographic variable, a concise list of correlated variables were 
identified for overall identity theft per capita rates and also for each of the subcategories.  
These tests were repeated for both years in order to determine if the patterns are static or 
are temporally evolving. 
The use of per capita rates in lieu of actual incident counts has been common 
practice throughout crime mapping research (ID Analytics 2007a, 2007b; Lottier 1938a, 
1938b; Shannon 1954).  The method retains validity because per capita figures are 
normalized by current population counts, thus representing the rate of identity theft by 
an intensity ratio within each state for a specific year, regardless of state population 
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differences.  For example, one would expect more occurrences of a phenomenon in a 
highly populated state such as California, than in a state with a low population, such as 
Vermont.  By comparing ratios, a better representation is achieved which accounts for 
population differences.  Therefore, per capita rates are a good indicator of the 
pervasiveness of the crime within each state.   
Linear regression is chosen as the appropriate and optimal statistical tool since all 
variables involved are continuous (e.g. categories such as race, urban/rural are measured 
as either actual population counts, or on a 100-scale percentage such as per-capita 
values).  The variables were further tested for residual normality, constant variance, 
collinearity, extreme outliers, and extreme leverage values.  The result was a concise, 
workable demographic database (Table 5) with all variables showing significance in 
relation to the identity theft data with particular attention paid to potential problematic 
issues, such as heteroscedascity or collinearity in the data.   
 
 
Table 5: Demographic Variables Correlated with Identity Theft Categories 
Variable Definition Highest Correlation R2 
Value with Per Capita 
Identity Theft Rates 
CredIssu Number of businesses issuing credit .458 
DigEcon Digital Economy Index score  .344 
HISP_pct Percent of population that is Hispanic .782 
HspEst Hispanic Population Estimate .434 
HspFamSz Average statewide family size, head of 
household Hispanic 
.333 
MilBarak Population living in military group quarters .311 
OnlinePop Online population .400 
UrbanPct Percent of population living in urban areas .622 
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3.2.2 GIS mapping 
 
GIS mapping was conducted in order to visualize regional patterns in the data.  
ArcGIS 9.0 was used to create the maps by joining the master database containing both 
identity theft and demographic data to appropriate shape files for each mapping 
technique.  For the identity theft data, a set of maps was produced for both 2002 and 
2006 data.  A set of maps was also produced for the selected demographic variables. 
Choropleth maps were first created for both identity theft and demographic data by 
joining the master database to a polygon shape file of the 48 contiguous U.S. states.  
Alaska and Hawaii were omitted from the mapping as they are geographically detached 
from the mainland and therefore cannot be part of a regional cluster.  The choropleth 
maps were produced using six classes (quintiles method), or eight states per 
classification. The use of equal count classification quintiles is a commonly used method 
for regional crime mapping, dating as far back as Lottier (1938a, 1938b).  The quintiles 
method is chosen here to reveal regional patterns as the classes are not based on an 
arbitrary value (which would vary by year), but are selected solely on the basis of state 
membership for each class based on the data for that year.    The initial maps revealed 
that regional differences are most prominent for identity theft data when normalized with 
population values (producing per capita equivalent values).   
Understanding, however, that information flows and identity theft patterns likely do 
not adhere to political boundaries, a secondary set of spatially interpreted maps is needed 
in order to reveal regional patterns independent of arbitrary state borders.  Inverse 
distance weighting (IDW) is chosen as the spatial interpolation method here.  IDW is 
 34 
based on Tobler’s First Law of geography, which posits that things closer together in 
space are more related than things farther away (Tobler 1970).  In IDW, values at known 
locations are used to interpolate expected values at points in-between.  Values nearer to 
the point to be interpolated will have more influence than points farther away, and the 
weighted influence of points (or neighbors) is determined by the value of the weighting 
parameter. Specifically, IDW is defined as: 
∑
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Where d = distance between given and observed points; z = observation point; N = 
number of observations; i = iteration; z′  = weighted value at the given point; and r = 
weighting parameter. 
Unlike choropleth mapping which requires polygon data, spatial interpolation 
requires point data.  To create the point file, state population centroids were extrapolated 
based on the populations of the top identity theft reporting cities in each state (according 
to the FTC).  The master database was then joined to the state centroids shape file, thus 
providing for spatial interpolation via inverse distance weighting (IDW).  The resulting 
maps are continuous raster surfaces showing regional patterns of identity theft intensities 
across states.  As with the choropleth maps, six classes were designated using the 
quintiles method in order to maintain comparability of the mapping techniques.  Because 
the IDW method is unable to interpolate beyond the outermost point, the centroids in 
Washington, California, Maine, and Florida were manually nudged to prohibit mid-state 
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truncation of the interpolation raster surface.  The resulting maps reveal distinct regional 
variations in the data similar to the comparable choropleth maps.   
 
3.2.3 Spatial statistics analysis 
 
  The third level of analysis for this research employs spatially specific procedures 
in order to detect significant clustering and/or outliers within the data.  This procedure is 
necessary to corroborate the findings of the GIS maps, and to further analyze the data 
with specialized spatial statistical tools in order to mathematically bolster the patterns 
and clusters identified with ArcGIS.  LISA analysis is excellent for identifying hot spots, 
geographic clusters, and spatial outliers (Anselin 1995), which is particularly apropos to 
the patterns observed in the ArcGIS analysis. 
GeoDa, a spatial statistics package developed by the Spatial Analysis Lab at the 
University of Illinois, was utilized to apply local indicators of spatial autocorrelation 
(LISA) to the data.  LISA analysis specifically examines the spatial aspects of data by 
linking individual observations to global measures via spatial weighting matrices, and 
works well in both spatial pattern exploration and confirmation (Anselin 1995).  LISA is 
often used to analyze the spatial characteristics of large spatially referenced data sets.  
However, Anselin (1995) shows that it is also effective in the analysis of smaller datasets 
(n < 50), by using LISA to successfully reveal spatial patterns of conflict amongst 42 
African countries.  Therefore, LISA is an appropriate tool for this project where n = 48, 
composed of state polygons.  The LISA results corroborate the findings of the GIS 
mapping and the initial regression analyses to ensure that the regional patterns and 
 36 
clusters revealed in the GIS mapping are true and mathematically supported, and not 
merely a product of cartographic manipulation.   
LISA analysis can be executed on either original data, as in this thesis, or 
standardizations.  LISA incorporates neighborhood analysis and distance weighting in 
the calculations whereby the tests are specifically designed to determine significant 
regional clustering and/or outliers within the data. 
Specifically, in GeoDa univariate LISA is defined as: 
 
( ) ( )
( )
∑
∑
−
−−
=
j
xj
xjijxi
i
n
x
xwx
I 2µ
µµ
 
 
where x
 
are observations, and wij is a spatial weights matrix equal to 1/dij in which dij 
represents the Cartesian distances between the ith and jth points.  The spatial weights 
matrix for a polygon shape file can be either Rook (common boundary) or Queen 
(common boundaries and vertices), or can be based on the distance between points, such 
as polygon centroids (Figure 1).   
 
 
Figure 1: Rook vs. Queen Contiguity  
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 For this thesis, all three spatial weights methods were explored. Queen continuity 
produced the best results, capturing more accurate state neighborhoods because all states 
do not share common boundaries, yet are considered neighbors at one or more vertices 
(e.g. UT, AZ, CO, and NM). 
 In the results, a positive Ii value indicates a spatial clustering of similar values 
(similar high or similar low values), while a negative Ii  value indicates a spatial 
clustering of dissimilar values, such as when a high value is surrounded by neighbors 
with low values, or vise versa.   Thus, the LISA Ii value reveals clusters of either 
stability (similarities) or outliers of instability (dissimilarities) in the spatial data.   
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4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
 
4.1. Results  
 
Overall, regional patterns were clearly identified.  Consistent with the earlier media 
reports, the desert southwest states appear to maintain the highest per capita rates, while 
the plains states and upper New England have the lowest per capita rates.  Some of the 
subcategories show unique patterns.  For example, there was an eastern shift in identity 
theft in the form of government document fraud by 2006, which analysts believe is a 
result of a sharp increase in fraudulent government benefit claims after Hurricane 
Katrina (Conkey 2006).  The highest demographic correlations were with states with 
higher Hispanic populations.   
 
4.1.1.   Identifying unique spatial and temporal patterns  
 
The ArcGIS maps revealed existing regional patterns in the identity theft and 
demographic data.  On the whole, identity theft patterns appear to be relatively static 
from 2002 through 2006, however, some categories do exhibit spatial changes.   
 When looking at actual identity theft counts, no clear regional patterns emerge.  
Rather, states with the highest populations, such as California, Texas, Florida, New 
York, Illinois, and New Jersey consistently and expectedly report high numbers of 
identity theft complaints. However, by normalizing the identity theft complaints by the 
population, a common long-term practice in past regional studies, per capita rates of 
identity theft are produced, which offer a better representation of the varying statewide 
intensities of the crime (ID Analytics 2007a; 2007b; Lottier 1938b). These maps 
 39 
revealed that the per capita rates of identity theft do exhibit clear regional variations 
(Figure 2).  The normalized data reveal two distinct regional patterns of identity theft.  
The desert southwest and western states exhibit much higher rates, and the middle and 
northern plains and upper New England states typically report much lower rates for both 
2002 and 2006.   
 
Actual Identity Theft Counts Per Capita Rates 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Comparison Maps of Identity Theft Per Capita Rates 
 
 
 
 Although most of the FTC categories show similar patterns to the overall data (some 
more than others), there are some regional pattern differences.  In 2002, most of the FTC 
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categories had similar per capita patterns.  In particular, bank, loans, phone and utility, 
and credit card identity theft categories were most similar to overall 2002 per capita 
patterns, but employment related and government document identity theft had a more 
southern U.S./Mexico border concentration with much less clustering in the northern 
plains (Figure 3). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Spatial Patterns of Some FTC Identity Theft Categories in 2002 
 
 
 By 2006, the highest per capita identity theft states had shifted towards a more 
southern U.S./Mexico border clustering with perhaps the appearance of a southeastern 
cluster centered on Florida and Georgia (Figure 4).  Loan, phone and utilities, and 
employment related identity theft patterns were remarkably similar to overall patterns, 
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while credit card and bank related identity theft maintained dominance in west coast 
states, and identity theft in the form of government document fraud continued to spread 
across the entire southern U.S. with a clear increase in the southeast (Figure 3). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Spatial Patterns of Some FTC Identity Theft Categories in 2006 
 
 
 The spatial statistics LISA maps corroborate the patterns and clusters identified in 
the ArcGIS mapping, and especially illustrate the eastward shift in government 
document identity theft earlier identified.  In 2002, a strong clustering of similar high 
values for per capita identity theft was confirmed for the southwestern states of CA, OR, 
NV, NM, and AZ.  A strong clustering of similar low values for per capita identity theft 
was confirmed for MN, SD, and MT.  By 2006, the clustering of high identity theft 
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states expanded to include CO as well, and ND was added to the cluster of low identity 
theft states.  By 2006, UT and OK emerged as low spatial outliers, meaning that they had 
relatively low rates of identity theft, yet were adjacent to neighbor states with high 
values. 
 As shown by the GIS mapping, most of the specific identity theft categories 
produced maps very similar to the overall identity theft rates. However, government 
document identity theft is particularly interesting, as it is the only category exhibiting a 
noteworthy geographic shift from 2002 through 2006.  The LISA analysis corroborates 
the eastward shift identified in the ArcGIS mapping (Figure 5).  Both sets of maps show 
a 2002 cluster of states with high identity theft rates in the form of government 
document and benefits fraud in the southwest states, and a cluster of states with low rates 
in the in the upper plains states.  By 2006, a strong eastward shift had occurred, resulting 
in a cluster of states experiencing high government document and benefits identity theft 
in the southeast states, including LA, MS, AL, GA, and FL, and possibly TX.  Both the 
ArcGIS maps and the LISA maps clearly illustrate this shift. 
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Per Capita Identity Theft Rates 2002 
 
Per Capita Identity Theft Rates 2006 
 
 
Government Document Fraud in 2002 
 
 
 
Government Document Fraud in 2006 
 
 
   Figure 5:  LISA Spatial Statistics Cluster Maps, Using Per Capita Data 
 
 
 
4.1.2 Exploring demographic factors that may shape regional patterns  
 
 The purpose of the SPSS linear regression tests were to determine which 
demographic variables correlate best with the identity theft data.  To do this, univariate 
and multivariate linear regression tests were systematically performed in order to check 
all demographic variables against identity theft categories.  The results were successful, 
with some demographic variables returning correlation values (R2) in excess of 0.700.  
Overall, the regression tests successfully identified which demographic variables have 
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correlating spatial relationships to identity theft patterns (see Appendix B for complete 
list of results).  The following paragraphs outline the general procedure performed and 
results for all identity theft categories in both 2002 and 2006. 
 In 2002, the demographic variables that returned the highest R2 correlations with 
overall per capita identity theft rates were UrbanPct (.609), HISP_pct (.432), OnlinePop 
(.395), Est2002 (.376), DigEcon (.307), and HspFamSz (.304).  Using these variables as 
multiple independents, the resulting multivariate model had a strong R2 value of .753, 
adjusted R2 of .719, and a p-value of .000 (recall Ho: β1 = 0).  However Est2002 and 
OnlinePop exhibited high collinearity.  After removing Est2002 (the variable with the 
highest variance inflation factor or VIF), the collinearity problem was eliminated, 
resulting in the best multiple regression model with an R2 of .747, adjusted R2 of .718, 
and a p-value of .000.  In sum, nearly 75-percent of the variance of statewide per capita 
identity theft rates is explained by the states’ online population count, digital economy 
index score, hispanic family sizes, hispanic percent of the population, and percent of the 
population that is urban. 
 Similar results emerged for each of the FTC categories.   For all FTC categories, the 
percent of population that is Hispanic (HISP_pct) showed strong R2 values with per 
capita identity theft rates.  In particular, employment fraud (R2 .669), government 
document fraud (R2 .697), and loan fraud (R2 .419) had the highest correlations with 
Hispanic population percentages.  UrbanPct and OnlinePop also consistently returned 
higher R2 values for each of the FTC categories. 
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 Following the selection of the best demographic variables for 2002, the next task is 
to determine whether the patterns are static or are temporally changing.  To do this, the 
2006 identity theft per capita data was also analyzed, using the corresponding 
demographic variables listed above.  Whenever possible, the same demographic 
variables were used as the x-independents for the 2002 data.  However, when available, 
such as with annual population estimates, 2006 data was used.  Overall, the results are 
similar to the 2002 identity theft data, but there are some differences (Appendix 2).  This 
may be due to the spatial shifts revealed earlier by the GIS and spatial statistics mapping.  
The most noteworthy change in the data, as previously mentioned, is with identity theft 
in the form of government document and benefits fraud.  An obvious and distinct 
eastward shift occurred by 2006, which is largely attributed to the dramatic rise in 
fraudulent aid claims in the wake of Hurricane Katrina (Conkey 2007).  The other FTC 
categories did not exhibit significant departures from the overall identity theft rates. See 
Appendix B for a summary of correlations for each identity theft category in 2002 and 
2006. 
 The demographic maps help to illustrate why certain variables had higher 
correlations with identity theft patterns (Figure 6).  For example, the concentration of 
some identity theft categories along the U.S./Mexico border coincides with several 
Hispanic variables.  Not surprisingly, the states with the highest percentage of their 
population that is Hispanic are concentrated in the south and west along the U.S./Mexico 
border.  There also exists a noteworthy cluster of western states with larger average 
Hispanic family sizes, as nationwide average Hispanic family sizes vary by up to 2:1.  
 46 
Southwestern states also tend to have a much higher percent of the population that is 
urban.  It is interesting to note that states such as Nevada and Utah, which typically are 
not thought of as urban, have very high urban population ratios, as most of the 
population lives within one or two large MSAs, and there are fewer small towns, 
villages, and settlements.  As a result, states like Nevada and Utah are more urbanized 
than New York in terms of their population distributions.  States with the highest digital 
economy index scores are clustered in the west and in New England.  States with the 
large military barrack populations are in the southeast, plus Texas, California, and 
Washington.  Demographic variables with less obvious spatial patterns are the number of 
credit issuing businesses and online population.  These variables show no clear 
clustering of high values, but they both have some clustering of low values in the plains 
states, which likely explains why they returned good correlation values for some identity 
theft categories. 
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Choropleth Map of Percent Hispanic Pop 
 
LISA Cluster map of Percent Hispanic Pop 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Spatial Patterns of Some Demographic Variables 
 
 
 
4.2. Discussions 
  
4.2.1 Significance of the observed regional patterns of identity theft 
 
This study clearly illustrates the regional patterns of identity theft, which have 
particular significance in regards to two major rationales. 
First, not only are the overall patterns of identity theft persistent from 2002 through 
2006, they appear to adhere to known historic patterns for traditional larceny (theft), 
which leads to further insight regarding the significance of spatial patterns of crime in 
general.  As early as the 1930s, state-level crime mapping revealed that clearly defined 
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regional patterns existed for different crimes (measured as per capita rates) (Lottier 
1938b).  For example, high murder rates were concentrated in the southeastern states 
(FL, GA, AL, TN, AR, SC, NC, and KY).  Robbery (or holdups) had particularly low 
rates in the New England states, and higher concentrations in the middle states (KY, TN, 
AR, IL, OK, CO, AZ).  Most interesting, however, is that larceny, defined as the stealing 
of valuable property (Lottier 1938a), had remarkably similar regional patterns to recent 
identity theft.  Lottier (1938b) discovered a western region of high larceny rates that 
included the states of TX, NM, AZ, NV, OR, MT, and WY.   Larceny rates were low in 
a cluster of New England states including ME, NH, VT, NY, PA, and MA.  In 1954, 
Shannon corroborated the persistence of these patterns in a follow up study, and by the 
1970s and 1980s, crime geographers also reported the persistence of these regional 
patterns (Harries 1974; Herbert 1982).  These studies clearly illustrate that the observed 
patterns had remained constant over time. 
Although identity theft and larceny are fundamentally different, (larceny is 
considered a traditional crime while identity theft is considered a white-collar crime), 
they are both typically non-violent, and involve the direct theft of valuable goods from a 
victim.  One major difference is that traditional theft is spatially dependent, because in 
order to steal physical property, an offender needs opportunity and proximity to do so.  
Despite the fact that identity theft, which many believe is increasingly occurring over the 
Internet, defies the need for such proximity, as a category of theft it appears to be 
following the patterns historically identified for traditional theft.  This further illustrates 
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that place matters in theft crime patterns, whether digital or traditional, and reemphasizes 
the need to identify what local factors directly contribute to theft. 
Following the social ecology tradition of spatial crime studies throughout the 20th 
century, Lottier and Shannon rejected theories of physical determinism and proposed 
that crime is a societal and cultural product.  Lottier (1938b) concluded that crime 
concentrated in urban areas, but differed regionally because of cultural differences.  
Lottier concluded that cities in general offered the benefit of anonymity for all criminal 
behavior, but that regional cultural differences are the reason for regional crime patterns. 
If this is true, then geographic crime patterns will continue to persist, even in cyberspace 
where anonymity is paramount.  These cultural differences, he believed, arose as a result 
of differential developments in transportation, communication, agriculture, and 
technology.  Of course, in the 1930s, no one could possibly comprehend a digital future 
of ubiquitous and instant communication, or modern computing capabilities.  What is 
interesting, then, is that the observed theft patterns do appear to persist in the digital age, 
thus reemphasizing the potential importance of local population composition on the 
spatial patterns of crime.  In sum, regional patterns of crime appear to be persistent in 
space regardless of developments in communications, transportation, and technology.   
The main objective stemming from this argument is to illustrate the persistence of 
spatial patterns of theft crimes over time, regardless of technological developments.  
This is an important realization in the study of identity theft patterns, as it confirms that 
place remains significant, regardless of the technology used.  It also provides a 
theoretical basis to justify further in-depth analysis of local populations.   If place 
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matters, a better understanding of the characteristics of local populations is a first step in 
understanding potential social characteristics associated with identity theft, and this 
thesis is an early attempt in achieving this goal. 
The second reason the observed spatial patterns are important is in regards to the 
spatial shift of identity theft in the form of government document and benefits fraud.   
This shift is important towards this research less because of the fact that it occurred, and 
more because of why it occurred, and what it means.  Because the shift is suspected of 
being directly related to the aftermath of hurricane Katrina, it is an excellent example of 
how crime patterns can be affected by localized conditions. Katrina created a situation 
where massive physical changes occurred in the landscape and in the human condition.  
In addition to the physical damages caused by the storm and subsequent flooding, a 
large-scale human migration also occurred.  A chaotic period of time also presented 
increased opportunities for crime, which was first witnessed in the looting, theft, and 
violence in the immediate aftermath, and which eventually appears to have also affected 
some forms of identity theft.  In other words, crime patterns were significantly shaped by 
changes in local population conditions. 
Therefore, the spatial shift that exists in the identity theft data supports the 
hypothesis that the human condition at a specific place and time can, and does, affect the 
regional patterns of crime.  Place, and the people who live there, are important factors. 
 51 
4.2.2 Identity theft, terrorism, and homeland security 
 
Perhaps the most critical policy arena affected by increasing knowledge of identity 
theft is in regards to terrorism and homeland security.  Researchers have learned that 
identity theft and credit card fraud are primary funding and operational methods for 
terrorist activity in the United States.  Overall, identity theft is directly connected with 
both domestic and international terrorism (9/11 Commission 2004; Collins 2006; 
Comras; 2005; Kaplan et. al 2005; O’Neil 2007; Sullivan 2004; Talbot 2005; Willox & 
Regan 2002).  Although this study does not specifically explore policy to thwart 
terrorism through identity theft protection and deterrence, a better understanding of 
identity theft may be critical to better homeland security.   
Identity theft and document fraud are universally recognized as instrumental terrorist 
operational tools.  In all likelihood, fraud and identity theft are probably the most 
common tactics utilized globally by terrorists.  The al Qaeda manual specifically 
mandates the use of falsified and stolen documents (even prescribing multiple identities 
per terrorist) in order to fraudulently obtain official documentation, travel, establish 
utilities, obtain financing, rent housing, vehicles and mail boxes, and anonymously carry 
out “assassination operations” (Collins 2006, p. 20).  O’Neil (2007) states that “the 9/11 
hijackers committed a wide variety of immigration offenses in order to enter the United 
States. The 19 hijackers used 364 aliases, several had fraudulently altered their 
passports, …[and] lied on their visa applications…” (p. 18).  Sadly, there are countless 
examples such as these that illustrate the pervasiveness of identity theft and document 
fraud by terrorists who eagerly take advantage of various loopholes and systemic 
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weaknesses in their operations and planning (Table 6).  For example, as late as the mid-
1990s, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) was operating with outdated 
technology, which created an environment grossly inadequate to prevent fraudulent 
international asylum applicants. Terrorist watch lists were inaccurate and unenforceable 
throughout the 1990s, and visa processing procedures were in dire need of reform (9/11 
Commission 2004).   
 
Table 6: Known Uses of Identity Theft and Fraud by Terrorists 
Individual 
Terrorist(s) 
and/or Group 
Plot or 
Operation Identity Theft or Fraud Activity 
Ajmad Ajaj and Ramzi 
Yousef 
1993 WTC 
Bombing 
Illegal US immigration via document fraud 
Tawfiq bin Attash (aka 
Khallad) 
USS Cole 
Attack 
Applied for US visa under false identification 
Ramzi Binanshibh Intended 9/11 
pilot 
Applied for travel documentation under fraudulent identity 
(Ramzi Omar) 
Atta, Shehhi, Jarrad 9/11 Pilots Falsified/obtained passports; fraudulent US visa applications 
Ahmed Ressam Foiled Y2K 
Bombings 
Illegal immigration via document fraud, altered passport to 
conceal Afghan travel, illegal trafficking of passports, credit 
cards, and identity documents via an Islamic terrorist 
document broker 
Hazmi and Hanjour 9/11 hijackers Used fraudulent documents to obtain photo IDs from the New 
Jersey and Virginia DMV 
Imam Samundra Bali bombings Partially financed the operation through online credit card 
fraud 
Al Qaeda 9/11, others Passport alteration, document fraud, identity theft  
Sources: 9/11 Commission Report, 2004; Talbot 2005; Kaplan, Fang, and Sangwan 2005  
 
 
It is important to note that terrorist identity theft extends far beyond the mere 
theft and misuse of personal information for operations support, financing, and planning.  
Without identity theft, terrorists may not be able to freely travel internationally, the 
importance of which is paramount in that:  
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 For terrorists, travel documents are as important as weapons. Terrorists must 
travel clandestinely to meet, train, plan, case targets, and gain access to attack. 
[They accomplish this through] …altered and counterfeit passports and visas, 
specific travel methods and routes, liaisons with corrupt government officials, 
human smuggling networks, supportive travel agencies, and immigration and 
identity fraud (9/11 Commission 2004, p 384). 
 
Not surprisingly, al Qaeda is notorious for operating organized scams to facilitate 
a steady supply of fraudulent/stolen documents.  For example prior to 9/11, al Qaeda ran 
the passport office in the Kandahar airport in which they facilitated illegal terrorist travel 
via altering and/or falsifying travel documents, passports, visas, and identification cards. 
Fourteen of the 9/11 hijackers are believed to have used passports that were altered in 
the Kandahar office.  Al Qaeda also implements ‘passport collection schemes,’ which 
involves the confiscation of passports of Northern Alliance fighters prior to deployment 
so that if the fighter dies, the passport can be used for someone else. In addition, the 
terrorists themselves (e.g. Mohamed Atta) receive specific training in document forgery 
to empower them to travel clandestinely and independently cover their tracks as they 
traverse (9/11 Commission 2004).  Perhaps most shocking is the violence and brutality 
which al Qaeda has imposed to fraudulently obtain false identities.  James Woolsey, 
former head of the CIA, reported that twelve of bin Laden’s known terrorists had stolen 
the identities of western-educated men, murdered them and their entire families in order 
to eradicate any links back to the real individuals, and then proceeded to use the 
identities in global travel (Collins 2006). 
Al Qaeda is not the only group known to engage in elaborate identity theft and 
fraud schemes, and numerous agencies actively participate in combating the problem. 
For example, the UN Monitoring Group reports theft rings that finance terrorist groups 
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through identity document trafficking, stolen/forged credit cards and credit card 
numbers, and stolen passports (Comras 2005).  Additionally, the U.S. Secret Service has 
included in its mission statement the investigation of “…financial crimes that 
include…access device fraud, financial institution fraud, identity theft, [and] computer 
fraud…” (US Secret Service 2007).  By 2008, a special Secret Service Financial Crimes 
Division (FCD) had been established to investigate financial crimes specifically.   
Efforts in exposing identity theft organizations have had particular successes. In 
1998, for example, two terrorist groups were discovered to have stolen over $21 million 
from U.S. banks via credit card fraud (Sullivan 2004).  In 2004, a Brooklyn couple ran 
an extensive identity theft ring and was suspected of terrorist connections due to 
incriminating possessions and a history of large money transfers to China and Turkey.  
During a raid of their apartment, police found over 1,000 credit card numbers, blank and 
forged credit cards, credit card readers, $17,000 in cash, and suspicious computer 
software.  The couple also had 54 separate bank accounts which held up to $50,000 each 
(Healy 2004).  Lastly, supporters of the 9/11 attacks were indicted for generating over $1 
million through stolen credit cards and false identities and transferring it to Saudi Arabia 
via clandestine couriers to avoid detection of large electronic transfers (Sullivan 2004). 
Clearly, due to the direct threat towards citizens, and the indirect threat of homeland 
security at the local, state, and national levels, the crime of identity theft is in dire need 
of more research and better understanding. 
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5. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND FUTURE STUDIES 
 
 
5.1. Summary 
 
These initial assessments provide compelling evidence in support of the central 
hypothesis for this research, which is that regional trends exist for identity theft and that 
corresponding demographic variables are likely a contributing force.   Using aggregate 
data from the FTC and U.S. Census bureau, distinct regions of varying intensities of 
identity theft were revealed through GIS mapping and spatial statistics analyses.  By 
comparing 2002 and 2006 data, spatial and temporal shifts of identity theft patterns were 
also revealed.  Social and demographic correlations were identified, such as ethnicity 
ratios and urban composition of the population, which may indicate that certain 
population subsets may be at higher risk for identity theft victimization.  And lastly, the 
social implications of identity theft were discussed.  The persistence of identity theft 
patterns similar to the known patterns of traditional theft indicates that place matters in 
crime analysis, regardless of technological advances and the introduction of cyber theft.  
The spatial shift of identity theft in the form of government document and benefits fraud 
following hurricane Katrina clearly illustrates that the location of a major catastrophe 
and subsequent changes in the human conditions can precipitate a spatial shift that 
directly affects crime patterns.  And finally, a discussion of identity theft as a known 
facilitating method of terrorist precursor crimes revealed that identity theft creates far 
greater social detriment beyond the individual victims’ financial and personal losses.  In 
terms of homeland security, identity theft indirectly affects the national, perhaps even 
global, population. 
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5.2. Conclusions 
 
This project is the first known geographic analysis of identity theft, and is also an 
early attempt at identifying broad demographic trends directly associated with identity 
theft at a national scale.  This thesis observes identity theft from a general perspective, 
and provides a national-scale analysis of identity theft patterns in the U.S. from 2002-
2006.   
The results confirmed previously recognized trends such as higher rates in the 
southwestern states and lower rates in New England and the northern plains states.  The 
results also revealed interesting departures from the overall trends.  Although most 
identity theft categories were found to have similar patterns to overall identity theft, an 
eastern shift of government document fraud reports was identified.  Speculation that this 
trend may be a direct result of federal aid fraud after Hurricane Katrina indicates that 
major events can have a dramatic effect on crime patterns.  This is important, because it 
bolsters the argument that crime patterns are linked to the human social and 
demographic condition at particular locations, thus providing credence to the premise 
that social ecological spatial analysis of crime is an important contribution to a 
comprehensive body of literature regarding identity theft.  It will be interesting to 
observe if future trends persist in the wake of Hurricane Ike or any other major national 
disaster.   
Interestingly, identity theft appears to maintain the well-documented regional 
patterns of traditional larceny and theft crimes, thus indicating that geographically 
independent digital opportunities do not appear to eradicate the importance of place in 
 57 
criminal patterns.  It is evident that regardless of technological means, understanding 
where crime happens remains important in knowing why crime happens, to whom, and 
by whom, even in the digital age. 
Identity theft, like all crimes, is a human activity.  Policy will not be effective if we 
do not have a comprehensive understanding of the location and characteristics of the 
people who are not only committing the crime, but those who are at highest risk of 
victimization.  Geography is key in understanding the humanity of identity theft.  
“[C]omputers do not steal identities… people do (Collins 2006: 181),” and until we 
gain a better understanding of who and where those people are, there is no real hope of 
slowing the progress of identity theft. 
 
 
5.3. Future studies 
 
Identity theft is a growing and evolving problem that needs a multi-faceted and 
multi-disciplinary approach in order to fully understand it.  To date, several disciplines 
have engaged in nascent research into the complexity of the identity theft problem, and 
geographic research is an important contribution to this growing body of literature.  This 
thesis introduces identity theft for academic geographic research, and produces enough 
base knowledge to help identify specific areas in need of additional research.   
Although this research successfully identified broad-scale patterns for identity theft, 
is unable to detect detailed nuances in the data, such as specific character traits of 
complainants, specific hotspots, or other more precise variations within the data.   
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It is important to note that although numerous identity theft and demographic 
variables are analyzed in this research, this list is not exhaustive. This thesis does not 
attempt to definitively explain social causation towards identity theft behavior.  Rather, 
it seeks to identify potential social associations that may exist, thus enabling the 
possibility of more narrowly focused case studies testing the broad correlations 
identified here.  For example, a specialized study designed to examine whether identity 
theft patterns are categorically linked to the Hispanic population would enable 
researchers to further examine possible social factors that may be affecting this 
phenomenon.  Additionally, this study specifically addresses victims; however, to fully 
understand the nature of identity theft, more research needs to be done on offender 
patterns and characteristics as well. 
From this study, localized case studies are needed to determine if the regional 
observations exist at smaller-scales such as state, county, or local levels.  Localized 
analyses would reveal the effects of spatial scale on identity theft patterns, and may 
better identify hotspots of activity.  Disaggregated data would be helpful to facilitate 
small-scale analysis, and could be generated through surveys or cooperative local law 
enforcement agencies. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
LITERATURE-GUIDED DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES SELECTED FOR 
CORRELATION TESTING 
 
Variable  Definition 
Economic Indicator Variables 
CredIssu Number of businesses issuing credit, including credit card issuing, sales 
financing, and other non-depository credit intermediation 
CredPerCp Statewide per capita number of credit issuing businesses, per 100,000 
population, based on 2002 economic data and 2002 population estimates 
DigEcon Aggregated digital economy score. Produced by the Progressive Policy 
Institute (PPI) in the State New Economy Index, using 7 indicators to 
mreasure statewide progress to the Digital Economy (based on Census 
ACS 2003 Survey) 
OnlinePct Statewide percentage of population with internet access (based on 
Census 2003 ACS) 
OnlinePop Online population, calculated by multiplying 2003 estimated population 
by online percent values from the Census 2003 ACS 
Family Size Data (by Race) 
AsnFamSz Average statewide family size, head of household Asian, Census 2000 
AvgFamSz Average statewide family size, all races, Census 2000 
BlkFamSz Average statewide family size, head of household black, Census 2000 
HspFamSz Average statewide family size, head of household Hispanic, Census 
2000 
IslFamSz Average statewide family size, head of household Pacific Islander, 
Census 2000 
NatFamSz Average statewide family size, head of household Native American, 
Census 2000 
WhtFamSz Average statewide family size, head of household white, Census 2000 
General Statewide Population Data 
Est2002 Statewide U.S. Population Estimate for July 1, 2002 
Est2006 Statewide U.S. Population Estimate for July 1, 2006 
DormPop Statewide population living in college dorms, Census 2000 
MilBarak Statewide population living in military group quarters, Census 2000 
Rural2000 Total statewide rural population counts from 2000 Census 
RuralPct Percent of Census 2000 statewide population that is rural 
Urban2000 Total statewide urban population counts from 2000 Census. Total urban 
equals the urban area population plus cluster population 
UrbanPct Percent of Census 2000 statewide population that is urban 
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Variable  Definition 
Racial Data 
AmI2KPct Percent of state population that is Native American in Census 2000 
Asn2KPct Percent of state population that is Asian in Census 2000 
Blk2KPct Percent of state population that is black in Census 2000 
HISP_Pct Percent of Statewide Population that is Hispanic, Census 2000 
HspPct06 Percent of estimated 2006 population that is Hispanic 
HspEst02 Statewide Hispanic population estimate for July 1, 2002 
HspEst06 Statewide Hispanic population estimate for July 1, 2006 
PcI2KPct Percent of state population that is Pacific Islander in Census 2000 
Up2pct2K Percent of population that is two or more races in Census 2000 
WhtPct2k Percent of state population that is white in Census 2000 
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APPENDIX B 
 
SPSS REGRESSION ANALYSIS RESULTS – SELECTED DEMOGRAPHIC (X) 
VARIABLES FOR EACH IDENTITY THEFT (Y) VARIABLE 
 
 Summary of SPSS Results in Selecting the Best Demographic Variables 
Variable Definition R2 P-value 
 
For Y = PerCap02 (2002 ID Theft Per Capita)  
X1 = OnlinePop Online population .395 .000 
X2 = HspFamSz Average family size, household head Hispanic .304 .000 
X3 = DigEcon Digital economy index score .307 .000 
X4 = HISP_pct Percent of population that is Hispanic .432 .000 
X5 = UrbanPct Percent of population that is urban .609 .000 
Multiple Regression R2 .753, Adjusted R2 .719, p-value .000, no collinearity 
 
For Y = CCpcap02 (Credit Card Fraud Per Capita)  
X1 = HISP_pct  Percent of population that is Hispanic .275 .000 
X2 = UrbanPct Percent of population that is urban .587 .000 
X3 = DigEcon Digital economy index score .277 .000 
X4 = OnlinePop Online population  .368 .000 
Multiple Regression R2 .662, Adjusted R2 .624, p-value .000, no collinearity 
 
For Y = GovPcp02 (Government Document Fraud Per Capita)  
X1 = OnlinePop Online population .400 .000 
X2 = HspFamSz Average family size, household head Hispanic .286 .000 
X3 = DigEcon Digital economy index score .201 .001 
X4 = HISP_pct Percent of population that is Hispanic .697 .000 
X5 = UrbanPct Percent of population that is urban .451 .000 
X6 = HspEst02 Hispanic population estimate for July 1, 2002 .434 .000 
X7 = MilBarak Population living in military group quarters .311 .000 
X8 = CredIssu Number of credit issuing businesses .381 .000 
Multiple Regression R2 .834, Adjusted R2 .806, p-value .000, no collinearity 
 
For Y = EmpPcp02 (Employment Related Fraud Per Capita)  
X1 = HspFamSz Average family size, household head Hispanic .214 .001 
X2 = HspEst02 Hispanic population estimate for July 1, 2002 .359 .000 
X3 = HISP_pct Percent of population that is Hispanic .669 .000 
Multiple Regression R2 .718, Adjusted R2 .700, p-value .000, no collinearity 
 
For Y = LnPcap02 (Loan Fraud Per Capita)  
X1 = OnlinePop Online population .382 .000 
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Variable Definition R2 P-value 
X2 = HspFamSz Average family size, household head Hispanic .225 .001 
X3 = HISP_pct Percent of population that is Hispanic .419 .000 
X4 = UrbanPct Percent of population that is urban .495 .000 
X5 = HspEst02 Hispanic population estimate for July 1, 2002 .295 .000 
X6 = MilBarak Population living in military group quarters .242 .000 
Multiple Regression R2 .699, Adjusted R2 .657, p-value .000, no collinearity 
 
For Y = BnPcap02 (Bank Fraud Per Capita)  
X1 = OnlinePop Online population .226 .000 
X2 = HspFamSz Average family size, household head Hispanic .333 .000 
X3 = DigEcon Digital economy index score .242 .000 
X4 = HISP_pct Percent of population that is Hispanic .373 .000 
X5 = UrbanPct Percent of population that is urban .427 .000 
X6 = MilBarak Population living in military group quarters .232 .000 
Multiple Regression R2 .627, Adjusted R2 .575, p-value .000, no collinearity 
 
For Y = PUpcap02 (Phone and Utilities Fraud Per Capita)  
X1 = OnlinePop Online population .378 .000 
X2 = HspFamSz Average family size, household head Hispanic .291 .000 
X3 = DigEcon Digital economy index score .232 .000 
X4 = HISP_pct Percent of population that is Hispanic .216 .001 
X5 = UrbanPct Percent of population that is urban .508 .000 
Multiple Regression R2 .834, Adjusted R2 .806, p-value .000, no collinearity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Summary of SPSS Results with 2006 Identity Theft Data 
Variable Definition R2 
value 
P-value 
 
For Y = PerCap06 (2006 ID Theft Per Capita)  
X1 = OnlinePop Online population .180 .002 
X2 = HspFamSz Average family size, household head 
Hispanic 
.159 .004 
X3 = DigEcon Digital economy index score .108 .020 
X4 = HISP_pct Percent of population that is Hispanic .782 .000 
X5 = UrbanPct Percent of population that is urban .359 .000 
Multiple 
Regression 
R2 .795, Adjusted R2 .781, p-value .000, no collinearity 
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Variable Definition R2 
value 
P-value 
For Y = CCpcap06 (Credit Card Fraud Per Capita)  
X1 = HISP_pct  Percent of population that is Hispanic .381 .000 
X2 = UrbanPct Percent of population that is urban .622 .000 
X3 = DigEcon Digital economy index score .344 .000 
X4 = OnlinePop Online population  .385 .000 
Multiple 
Regression 
R2 .715, Adjusted R2 .689, p-value .000, no collinearity 
 
For Y = GovPcp06 (Government Document Fraud Per Capita)  
X1 = OnlinePop Online population .308 .000 
X2 = DigEcon Digital economy index score .005 .611 
X3 = HISP_pct Percent of population that is Hispanic .228 .000 
X4 = UrbanPct Percent of population that is urban .164 .004 
X5 = HspEst06 Hispanic population estimate for July 1, 
2002 
.199 .001 
X6 = MilBarak Population living in military group quarters .174 .003 
X7 = CredIssu Number of credit issuing businesses .458 .000 
Multiple 
Regression 
R2 .726, Adjusted R2 .681, p-value .000, no collinearity 
 
For Y = EmpPcp06 (Employment Related Fraud Per Capita)  
X1 = HspFamSz Average family size, household head 
Hispanic 
.154 .005 
X2 = HspEst06 Hispanic population estimate for July 1, 
2002 
.196 .001 
X3 = HISP_pct Percent of population that is Hispanic .515 .000 
X4 = RuralPct Percent of population that is rural .184 .002 
Multiple 
Regression 
R2 .548, Adjusted R2 .508, p-value .000, no collinearity 
 
For Y = LnPcap06 (Loan Fraud Per Capita)  
X1 = OnlinePop Online population .269 .000 
X2 = HspFamSz Average family size, household head 
Hispanic 
.199 .001 
X3 = HISP_pct Percent of population that is Hispanic .587 .000 
X4 = UrbanPct Percent of population that is urban .445 .000 
X5 = HspEst06 Hispanic population estimate for July 1, 
2002 
.283 .000 
X6 = MilBarak Population living in military group quarters .167 .003 
Multiple 
Regression 
R2 .696, Adjusted R2 .654, p-value .000, no collinearity 
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Variable Definition R2 
value 
P-value 
For Y = BnPcap06 (Bank Fraud Per Capita)  
X1 = OnlinePop Online population .223 .001 
X2 = DigEcon Digital economy index score .197 .001 
X3 = HISP_pct Percent of population that is Hispanic .495 .000 
X4 = UrbanPct Percent of population that is urban .343 .000 
Multiple 
Regression 
R2 .555, Adjusted R2 .516, p-value .000, no collinearity 
 
For Y = PUpcap06 (Phone and Utilities Fraud Per Capita)  
X1 = OnlinePop Online population .007 .551 
X2 = HspFamSz Average family size, household head 
Hispanic 
.000 .907 
X3 = DigEcon Digital economy index score .001 .884 
X4 = HISP_pct Percent of population that is Hispanic .421 .000 
X5 = UrbanPct Percent of population that is urban .045 .862 
Multiple 
Regression 
R2 .502, Adjusted R2 .806470, p-value .000, no collinearity 
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